Abstract Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature before participating in the mechanism. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
Introduction
We consider a mechanism design setting in which multiple agents may acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. A mechanism proposed by the mechanism designer includes not only a social choice function (from agents' reported information to a social outcome) but also instructions from the mechanism designer to each agent as to how much information to acquire. Agents are endowed with private information
We like to thank an anonymous referee for many useful suggestions. Any remaining errors are ours. and they may covertly acquire additional information at some cost before deciding whether to accept the mechanism. The mechanism designer implements an outcome based on agents' reported signals. An agent's utility is a function of the outcome, the state of nature, and the cost of acquired information. As the state of nature is not observed perfectly and every signal is informative about the state of nature, this leads to an interdependent values setting. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
Ichiro
An example of our model is an auction where values have an unobservable common component. In most papers on auctions and on trading mechanisms, it is assumed that agents are endowed with some information and may not acquire any more. This assumption is implausible in many settings as agents can usually acquire information at a cost without being observed by other agents or the mechanism designer.
A social choice rule recommends a profile of (simultaneous) information acquisitions to agents and maps agents' reported information to an outcome. A mechanism is a social choice rule together with a payment function that maps reported information to each agent's payment.
A social choice rule is ex post efficient if it selects an ex post efficient outcome after every realization of information at the recommended level of information acquisition. It is ex ante efficient if it is ex post efficient and recommends a level of information acquisition that maximizes the sum of (ex ante) expected utilities net of information acquisition costs. A mechanism fully extracts surplus if its social choice rule is efficient 1 and each agent's interim expected surplus is zero. A social choice rule is implementable if it is a part of a mechanism that is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational.
Crémer and McLean [9] show that if agents are costlessly endowed with correlated information, then under some conditions on the information structure that are generically satisfied, full surplus extraction is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational. They provide two such conditions, the stronger one of which is the so called full-rank condition. In our setting with information acquisition, neither full surplus extraction nor efficiency is assured under their full-rank condition. We provide two examples to illustrate this: full-surplus extraction fails in one example and even efficient implementation fails in the other. In these examples, private signals are correlated and the full-rank condition of [9] is satisfied at all information acquisition levels.
We provide two sufficient conditions for efficient implementation. First, we show that efficient implementation is feasible for generic information structures when, for each agent, the set of other agents' endowed private signals is at least as large as either the set of states of nature that determine their utility or the agent's signal space (Proposition 1 and 2). The efficient mechanism is a version of the expected externality mechanism (d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [10] , Arrow [2] ).
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Another sufficient condition for efficient implementation is the existence of semi-robust lotteries (Proposition 3). A set of semi-robust lotteries for an agent is a menu of payments such that acquiring more information than the recommended level would not help the agent make a better choice from the menu. We also provide sufficient conditions for the existence of semi-robust lotteries (Proposition 4).
Next, we show (in Proposition 5) that a sufficient condition for full surplus extraction is the existence of robust lotteries, which are semi-robust lotteries that are fair, i.e., give the agent an expected payoff of zero independent of his private information. A sufficient condition for the existence of robust lotteries for an agent is that the agent's signal space is no larger than either the set of states of nature or the set of other agents' endowed signals (Proposition 6).
With independent information, it is known that efficient implementation is Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if values are private (Bergemann and Välimäki [4] , Stegeman [26] ). With positively interdependent values (and independent information), agents have an incentive to acquire more information than the socially optimal level (Bergemann, Shi and Välimäki [3] , Bergemann and Välimäki [4] ). The union of our sufficient conditions for efficient implementation covers the private value case as well as the case with interdependent values and correlated information. Our sufficient condition for full surplus extraction requires correlated information.
Although our primary focus is on the case with correlated information, our results are not a simple application of Crémer and McLean [9] . The fullrank condition of [9] is necessary for the existence of robust lotteries but not sufficient. Condition B of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [11] is necessary and sufficient for balanced-budget implementation. Both [11] and [9] study environments without information acquisition. 3 We discuss the relationship between semi-robust lotteries and Condition B of [11] in Section 4 and the connection between (semi-)robust lotteries and the full-rank condition of [9] in Sections 4 and 5.
Parreiras [24] shows that full surplus extraction may fail when each agent obtains two kinds of information exogenously: his payoff type and the informativeness of his type about the other agents' types. In our model, agents do not know their own type and acquire information about the types of all agents endogenously.
Obara [23] generalizes the model of Crémer and McLean [9] to a setting where agents take actions that change the distribution of their types that are payoff-relevant and finds a generic necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction. Our paper also generalizes [9] by allowing endogenous information acquisition. However, since we introduce a more specific structure to our model where payoffs and information about payoffs are distinguished, the necessary and sufficient condition in [23] on the joint distributions of private signals is never satisfied. Nonetheless, full surplus extraction is still possible in our setting because the set of possible utility functions is small as well.
Bikhchandani [6] shows that full surplus extraction fails if an agent can acquire costly information about other agents' types.
4 Unlike in our paper, agents are fully and costlessly informed about their own type in [6] . Another difference is that in our paper the set of information signals available to each agent cannot be ranked by informativeness. Our sufficient conditions for efficient implementation are different from those in [6] . Robust lotteries are shown to be sufficient for full surplus extraction in the model in [6] . Proposition 5 shows that robust lotteries are sufficient for full extraction in the more general model of this paper.
Neeman [22] notes that it is essential for the full-extraction result of Crémer and McLean that the belief of each agent pins down the payoff type of the agent, i.e., beliefs determine preferences (BDP property). This property is not necessarily satisfied in more general type spaces. 5 Heifetz and Neeman [18] establish that the BDP property is non-generic in a geometric sense and a measure-theoretic sense in any convex family of (common) priors. On the other hand, Chen and Xiong [7] show that the set of priors on the universal type space where (almost) full surplus extraction is possible is topologically generic. Gizatulina and Hellwig [16] show that BDP property is topologically generic in finite dimensional type spaces.
The model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3 we provide examples showing the failure of full surplus extraction and of efficient implementation. Sufficient conditions for efficient implementation and for full surplus extraction are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We end with a discussion in Section 6. Some proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
Consider a set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2. The state of nature ω ∈ Ω, where Ω is a finite set, determines agents' payoffs and is not observable, except perhaps after the end of the game. Importantly, the mechanism designer and the agents cannot contract on the state of nature. There is a common prior q ∈ ∆(Ω), where ∆(Ω) is the set of distributions on Ω.
Agent i can observe up to K i +1 private signalss i,k , k ∈ Z i = {0, 1, . . . , K i }. Each signals i,k has support in a finite set S i,k with |S i,k | ≥ 2 for each k. These private signals are conditionally independent across players given state ω. However, they may be correlated within each player. Formally, agent i's action set 4 Fang and Morris [13] show that the revenue equivalence theorem fails in an auction model in which each bidder observes a private signal about the other bidder's payoff type.
5 When BDP property is not satisfied, there may be two types whose belief types are the same, but payoff types are different. On the other hand, what causes a problem in [24] and [6] is the existence of two types with the same payoff and different beliefs. Thus, these papers provide somewhat complementary reasons for the failure of full surplus extraction.
Zi is a collection of subsets of private signals. If agent i chooses a i ∈ A i , then he observes a realization ofs i,k if and only if k ∈ a i and he pays cost c i (a i ) ≥ 0. The cost c i is increasing in the sense that c i (a i ) > c i (a i ) for any a i that is strictly larger than a i and a i \a i includes some k = 0. We assume that c i (a i {0}) = c i (a i ) for any a i . That is, agent i always (costlessly) observes signals i,0 . Essentially, agent i is endowed with signals i,0 . In the following, we assume without loss of generality that agent i always observess i,0 both in equilibrium and out of equilibrium.
The symbols ai denotes a vector of private signals (s i,k , k ∈ a i ). Also, s a−i −i = (s aj j , j = i). 6 We say that information is independent if and only ifs Zi i ,s be the probability distribution ofs
We make a full-support assumption:
Given q and p Let X be a compact set of outcomes. The monetary transfer from agent i to the mechanism designer is denoted t i ∈ R. Agent i's utility over outcome x, money transfer t i , and information acquisition decision a i takes a quasi-linear form
where u i (·, ω) : X → R + is continuous for each ω ∈ Ω. Each agent has a large enough supply of the money commodity so that the budget constraint is not binding.
We [9] when the values are private and Z i = {0} for each i.
An information structure is a set of states, a set of signals, and a set of (conditional) distributions over states and signals: (Ω, S Z , q, p), where S Z = (S Z1 1 , . . . , S Zn n ). A mechanism design problem is an information structure together with an outcome set, utility functions, and cost functions: (Ω, S Z , q, p, X, u, c) where u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) and c = (c 1 , . . . , c n ).
Agent i sends a message m i ∈ M i upon choosing a i and observing s ai i . Since we focus on pure strategy equilibrium, we can use S ai i as message space M i without loss of generality when a i is agent i's equilibrium action.
7 A social choice function f : S a → X maps agents' message s a to outcome in X. A social choice rule (a, f ) is an information acquisition recommendation for each agent and a social choice function. A payment function t : S a → R n maps agents' signals to transfers from the agents to the mechanism designer when a is recommended. A mechanism (a, f, t) is a social choice rule and a payment function t = (t 1 , . . . , t n ).
The mechanism designer and agents play the following game. First, the mechanism designer proposes a mechanism (a, f, t). As each agent i is costlessly endowed with signals i,0 , in any mechanism we can assume 0 ∈ a i . Next, each agent i covertly chooses an information acquisition level in A i , 8 observes the corresponding private signal(s), and then decides whether to accept the mechanism or not. If he decides to accept, then agent i reports a signal realization s ai i ∈ S ai i to the mechanism designer (simultaneously with all the other agents). 9 The mechanism designer implements the outcome f (s a ) and collects transfers t(s a ) based on the reported signal profile s a ∈ S a . We assume that the amount of information each agent acquires and whether or not each agent accepts the mechanism is not observable to the other agents. If an agent does not participate, his payoff, ignoring any information acquisition cost, is zero.
The assumption of conditional independence is not crucial for our results. In Proposition 3, 4, 5 and Corollary 1, the hypotheses are stated with respect to conditional distributions h
These results do not require independence of agents' private signals conditional on ω, i.e., they hold for general joint distributions over Ω × S Z . As Corollary 1 suggests, Proposition 1 and 2 can be modified to allow for private signals that are 7 See Proposition 1 in Obara [23] . 8 Any information acquisition level selected by agent i always includes his endowed signal 0.
9 If agent i reveals that he did not acquire the recommended information, either directly or indirectly by reporting sâ
i , then the mechanism designer treats the agent as a non-participant.
correlated conditional on ω. The sufficient condition for Proposition 6 is even weaker when private signals are correlated.
We consider a pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where agents are sequentially rational given their subjective belief computed via Bayes' rule at all private histories. As we are interested in efficiency and full surplus extraction, without loss of generality we restrict attention to mechanisms in which every agent always accepts the mechanism in equilibrium.
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Bayesian Incentive Compatibility
Bayesian incentive compatibility requires that each agent gathers exactly the amount of information specified by the mechanism designer and truthfully reports his signal. Suppose that the mechanism designer wants to implement a social choice rule (a, f ). The mechanism (a, f, t) satisfies agent i's Bayesian incentive compatibility constraint if for allâ
≥ E max max
This constraint takes into account the possibility that an agent may take any information-gathering action and after observing his signal may not participate or may participate but lie about his signal. Note that even if agent i takes an information-gathering actionâ i different from a i , the action specified by the mechanism designer, it is never in his interest to report a signal realization that is not in S ai i , the support ofs ai i . If agent i were to report a signal realization s ∈ S ai i then the mechanism designer concludes that agent i did not follow his proposal to acquire a i and accordingly ignores agent i's signal and treats him as a non-participant (see footnote 9); the same outcome could be achieved by not participating, an option that agent i has. Thus, without loss of generality, agent i reports a signal s ai i ∈ S ai i if he decides to participate. The incentive compatibility constraint, (2), also implies interim individual rationality on the equilibrium path. To see this, consider a deviation where agent i selects a i and opts out only when he observes a particular s ai i (otherwise agent i participates and reports his signal truthfully), then (2) reduces to
Consider a mechanism design problem (Ω, S Z , q, p, X, u, c) and a social choice rule (a, f ). If there exists t such that (2) is satisfied for each agent i then (a, f ) can be implemented in this mechanism design problem.
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An ex post efficient social choice function given a ∈ A is f * a : S a → X that satisfies
which is well defined by the compactness of X and continuity of V i with respect to x. Let
be the ex post maximized social surplus given (a, s a ) and let V (a) := E [V (a,s a )] be the ex ante maximum social surplus given a ∈ A. Then, a * is an (ex ante) efficient information acquisition level if
Efficient implementation occurs when (a * , f * a * ) is implemented as an outcome of the Bayesian game induced by some mechanism (a * , f * a * , t). Note that, if agent i deviates to a i = a * i , an ex post efficient outcome given (a i , a * −i ) need not be implemented.
We consider two possible objectives for the mechanism designer: efficiency and profit maximization. The two objectives need not be in conflict and are simultaneously satisfied if the mechanism designer is able to implement an efficient social choice rule and extract the entire surplus.
Two Examples
If Crémer and McLean [9] 's full-rank condition or (weaker) cone condition is satisfied, then there exist lotteries (i.e., transfers) t i (s i , s −i ) for each agent such that
The Crémer and McLean lotteries induce truth-telling in the absence of information acquisition.
In the first example below full surplus extraction is not possible, and in the second example efficient implementation (and therefore also full surplus extraction) is not possible. In these examples, Crémer and McLean [9] lotteries exist at every information acquisition level. Nonetheless, that does not prevent agents from acquiring more information than the efficient level. Each agent i costlessly observes signals i,0 ∈ { , h} aboutω. Agents' signals are independent conditional onω and for i = α, β,
First, consider the scenario where agents do not have the option of acquiring additional information aboutω, other than the private signal that each costlessly observes. Because agents have common values, any rule that always allocates the object to, say, α, is efficient. Then we can extract the full surplus from α by using Crémer and McLean lotteries.
Next, suppose that agent i, i = α, β has the option of acquiring, at cost c > 0, a second signals i,1 that reveals the true value ofω. The common value assumption implies that it is not efficient for any agent to acquire this costly information. Therefore, in any full surplus extraction scheme, no agent must acquire the second signal.
Suppose that (f, t) (with no acquisition of additional information) is a full surplus extraction mechanism. Since every allocation is efficient, we assume that the object is always allocated to agent α for simplicity. The same conclusion would be obtained based on similar arguments even if a more general social choice function is used.
Suppose that agent α deviates and covertly acquires the second signal at cost c. This second signal provides agent α with many options that he can exercise at the interim stage. For example, suppose that his expected payment conditional onω = 3∆ is more than 3∆. Then consider the following deviation: agent α acquires the second signal, does not participate in the mechanism if and only ifω = 3∆, and follows the equilibrium strategy otherwise. The gain from this deviation is q(3∆) (E[t α (s)|ω = 3∆] − 3∆) − c, which must be nonpositive. Conversely, suppose that his expected payment conditional onω = 3∆ is less than 3∆. Then consider the following deviation: agent α acquires the second signal, participate in the mechanism (and follow the equilibrium) if and only ifω = 3∆. The payoff from this deviation is q(3∆) (3∆ − E[t α (s)|ω = 3∆]) − c. This must be nonpositive as well because his equilibrium payoff is 0 by the assumption of full surplus extraction. Hence, noting that q(3∆) = 1 3 , we obtain the following inequality:
This means that agent α's expected payment must be almost equal to the object's value when he has the option of learning the true value and the cost of doing so is small. Similarly we can obtain the following inequality regarding ω = 0:
Now consider the following deviation: agent α acquires the second signal, participate in the mechanism (and follow the equilibrium) if and only ifω = 2∆. Agent α's payoff from this deviation is given by
because of the structure of the signal distribution. Hence the above value is bounded below by
which is strictly positive when ∆ > 6c. Hence there does not exist any full surplus extraction mechanism for this example when ∆ is large relative to c.
It is clear that efficient implementation is possible in Example 1: randomly assign the object to either α or β and do not collect any transfers. We turn to Example 2 for failure of efficient implementation.
Example 2: Failure of efficient implementation There are two symmetric agents α and β. A single indivisible object is to be allocated to either α or β. Each agent's valuation is the sum of a private value and a common value:
The value of X i depends on whether the stateω is ω α or ω β . This dependence is shown in the table below.
Each of the states ω α and ω β is realized with probability 0.5. Each agent i may observe two signals aboutω:s i,0 ∈ {ω α , ω β } ands i,1 ∈ {ω α , ω β }. The signals i,0 is free and correct with probability q > 0.5 (i.e., Pr(s i = ω y |ω = ω y ) = q, where y = α, β). Moreover,s α,0 ands β,0 are independent conditional on the true state ω. The signals i,1 costs c ω > 0 and completely reveals the realization of the stateω.
The common valueṼ is either 0 or ∆ > 0, both equally likely. Moreover, the distribution ofṼ is independent of the stateω ands 0 :
Each agent can obtain perfect information about the realized value ofṼ at cost c v > 0. However, acquisition of this costly information is inefficient as it does not increase allocative efficiency. Assume that c ω is large enough that it is not ex ante efficient for either agent to acquires i,1 . Further, assume that > 0 is small enough so that it is ex post efficient to allocate the object to agent α if and only if both agents' signals are ω α . Finally, note that it is ex ante efficient that neither agent gathers costly information aboutṼ as this is a common value. Thus none of the costly and perfectly informative signals (s i,1 aboutω and the signal aboutṼ ) should be acquired by any agent for efficiency.
We show that this efficient rule is not Bayesian implementable. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a Bayesian incentive-compatible efficient mechanism. By assumption, agent α truthfully reportss α,0 without acquirings α,1 or information aboutṼ . That is, α follows the efficient rule.
Suppose that agent β deviates and always announces ω β . Then he can win the object with probability 1, while he would lose the object ifs 0 = (ω α , ω α ) and he announces his signal truthfully. Let t β (s α,0 ,s β,0 ) be the transfer from β as a function of the two agents' reports. To deter this deviation,
needs to be large enough. Thus, as ∆ goes to infinity (recall that the size of ∆ does not affect the efficient rule), E [t β (s α,0 , ω β ) − t β (s α,0 , ω α )|s β,0 = ω α ] must go to infinity as well for any mechanism that implements the efficient rule. Now consider the following deviation by β. Agent β acquires the signal about V , then lies by announcing ω β only whens β,0 = ω α and V = ∆. Otherwise he always announcess β,0 truthfully. The incentive constraint regarding this deviation is as follows:
where Q y (ω z ) is β's expected payoff (including utility and payments) given that the true state is ω z and β announced ω y for y, z ∈ {α, β}.
Since Pr(s β,0 = ω α ) = 0.5 and Pr(Ṽ = 0) = 0.5, we have
We observed that the right-hand side of the inequality above increases without bound as ∆ increases, thus the left-hand side increases without bound as ∆ increases. Hence, either
Therefore, it becomes profitable for agent β to learn the true value ofω by acquiring the second signals β,1 . As this potential profit grows without bound as ∆ increases and the cost of obtaining the second signal is constant, agent β would prefer to obtain the second signal for a large enough ∆. This proves that it is impossible to implement efficient social choice rule when ∆ is large enough.
Efficient Bayesian Implementation
In this section, we provide two complementary sufficient conditions for efficient implementation via pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The first one allows us to construct a version of the expected externality mechanism. The second sufficient condition is the existence of a semi-robust lottery. Because our setting allows information acquisition, this condition is not directly comparable to the existence of a full surplus extraction lottery in Crémer and McLean [9] . However, as discussed at the end of this section, in models without information acquisition, a sufficient condition for the existence of a semi-robust lottery is weaker than the necessary and sufficient condition (i.e. cone condition) for existence of a full surplus extraction lottery.
Both sufficient conditions hold when, loosely speaking, each agent's signal space is not too large relative to the signal spaces of the other agents. 13 
Expected Externality Mechanism
Our first efficiency result provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a transfer for each agent that internalizes the expected externality on other agents given any signal he observes and any action he takes on and off the equilibrium path (assuming other agents take the equilibrium action).
We first define, for each agent i, a state space Ω −i that is sufficient to describe the payoffs and information of the agents other than i. To be precise, we define Ω −i as the coarsest partition of Ω, the state space of the model, such that j =i u j (·, ω) and p −i (·|ω) are invariant on each element of the partition. For example, consider a private value model where Ω = Ω 1 × · · · × Ω n and ω j ∈ Ω j only affects u j and the distribution ofs 
Proposition 1 Let a
* ∈ A be an efficient information acquisition profile for a mechanism design problem (Ω, S Z , q, p, X, u, c). Suppose that for every i ∈ N , a subset of vectors in d −i (·|s
and M
Zi i
form a basis for R |Ω−i| . Then the ex ante efficient information-acquisition level, a * , and the ex post efficient social choice function, f * a * , can be implemented.
Proof: In the following, it is assumed that no agent opts out. This is without loss of generality because one can decrease transfers by a constant so that all the participation constraints are satisfied.
First, it is shown that there exists t i : S a * → R, a transfer function for agent i, that satisfies (5) below, for every s
McLean and Postlewaite [21] discusses a notion of information size. However, their notion of information size is not directly relevant here.
where it is possible that s
Let D i be a S 
i .
Let Γ i be a |Ω −i | × |M as its column vectors. By assumption, the number of independent column vectors of P −i and
14 Hence there exists
Next, it is verified that a * i and f * a * can be implemented with the transfer t i just defined. The optimality of a * i and truthful reporting follow from the fact that, as can be seen in (5) 
14 The rank of P −i is the same as the rank of {d −i (·|s
by the definition of t i . Note that this is the expected social welfare (without the information acquisition cost) of allocation f * a * ( s
. Since f * a * does not take into account agent i's true action (a i = Z i ), it does not maximize the social welfare given (Z i , a * −i ). Hence agent i's ex ante expected payoff when choosing (Z i , a * −i ) is bounded above by V (Z i , a * −i ) + j =i c j (a * (iv) The model assumes that each agent chooses a set of signals once and for all simultaneously. We can also think of situations where each agent chooses signals sequentially. Then an agent may decide which costly signal he wishes to acquire next based on the realization of signals he has observed previously without knowing the information acquired by the other agents. Call this sequential information acquisition within agents. We can define efficient information acquisition rule within this class of sequential information acquisitions. Such sequential information acquisition improves efficiency, but Proposition 1 still extends to this case almost immediately. For within-agents sequential information acquisition, an efficient information acquisition rule is defined as a profile of contingent strategies (σ * 1 , . . . , σ * n ). Let S σ * j j be the set of all possible signal realizations for agent j given σ * j . Proposition 1 holds in this case if we replace s a To understand the condition for Proposition 1, consider the standard model with no information acquisition (i.e. Z i = {0}). Let Ω = Ω 1 × . . . × Ω n , where ω i completely determines agent i's utility function and the distribution of s i,0 . Then the following two familiar conditions imply the condition for Proposition 1. First, the condition is satisfied with independent private values (i.e. agent i's signal s i,0 does not depend on ω −i and (ω 1 , ..., ω n ) are independent). 15 In this case, M
is a set of |Ω −i − 1| vectors that are orthogonal to agent i's prior about ω −i , which is a convex combination of the posteriors about ω −i given the private signals of all the agents other than agent i. Hence those posteriors and M Zi i span entire R |Ω−i| . Second, the condition is satisfied when the information structure satisfies the full-rank condition in Crémer and McLean [9] , which requires h to be independent vectors. As already mentioned, this condition is stronger than the condition for Proposition 1 as shown in the proof of Corollary 1.
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Efficient implementation result for the independent private value case remains valid even with information acquisition. As long as agent i's signal is not informative about ω −i given any information acquisition level, the dimension of M
Zi i
is |Ω −i − 1|. Thus efficient implementation is always possible in private values models with information acquisition. This replicates the result of Bergemann and Välimäki [4] in a more general setting.
It is known that, with information acquisition, efficient implementation is impossible for the case with interdependent value and independent information. 17 
Proposition 1 shows that efficient implementation is possible when values interdependent and information is correlated.
Neither the VCG mechanism nor the expected externality mechanism guarantees efficiency in the standard interdependent value model. This is because agent i's true signal needs to be elicited to evaluate the externality of agent i's report on the other agents. In our setting, this corresponds to the fact that j =i V j (x, s a ) depends on s ai i . So we cannot internalize such externality for each realization of s a . However, a crucial observation for our result is that the expected externality conditional on ω −i , which is E j =i u j x( s forms a basis for R |Ω−i| by themselves, we can in fact replicate these expected values exactly state by 15 The signal s i,0 is often ω i itself in the standard model, including the model of Crémer and McLean [9] . 16 The weaker condition (cone condition) in Crémer and McLean [9] is not directly comparable to this condition. 17 This follows from the revenue equivalence theorem and the negative result of [4] , as noted in Bergemann, Shi, and Välimäki [3] . So we need correlation of private signals for our efficient implementation result when values are interdependent state, i.e., there exists t i that satisfies, for any ω −i and any s
This is why our mechanism relies on expected externality rather than exact externality.
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The condition for Proposition 1 is weaker than this. More generally,
does not have to span R |Ω−i| . Notice that agent i's transfer does not need to replicate the expected externality state by state exactly as long as it replicates the expected externality at the interim stage conditional on i's signal. This can be done more easily when the size of S Proof: We can restrict our attention to the case where q has full support for this genericity result. First, consider the case where S 0 −i is larger than or equal to |Ω −i |. Consider a set of (q, p) where p −i (·|ω −i ), ω −i ∈ Ω −i is linearly independent. In this set, p a * −i −i (·|ω −i ), ω −i ∈ Ω −i is linearly independent whatever the efficient action profile a * −i is, hence Proposition 1 applies at least for player i. We show that this set is open and dense.
Openness is trivial. To show that this set is dense, take any (q, p). Take p such that p −i (·|ω −i ), ω −i ∈ Ω −i is linearly independent. Define p(t), t ∈ [0, 1] by p(t)(·|ω) := t p(·|ω) + (1 − t)p(·|ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. We have a one-parameter family of conditionally independent distributions that connect p and p. Then it can be shown that p(t) −i (·|ω −i ), ω −i ∈ Ω −i is linearly independent for almost all t (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [14] ). Hence we can find p arbitrary close to p such that p −i (·|ω −i ), ω −i ∈ Ω −i is linearly independent. This proves denseness. whatever the efficient action profile a * is, thus Proposition 1 applies for player i.
Semi-Robust Lotteries
Next we turn to a complementary sufficient condition under which efficient implementation is obtained. Our second sufficient condition allows us to enforce any action and any allocation independent of the shape of utility functions. In that sense the analysis is very different from that of Section 4.1. Following Crémer and McLean, it is useful to view transfers as a lottery by which an agent, based on his information, bets on the announcements of other agents. A set of lotteries is semi-robust for agent i given a if agent i cannot make a better choice by acquiring more information than a i . More precisely, By using semi-robust lotteries for Bayesian implementation, we can discourage agents from acquiring more information or from acquiring less information than the target level. It does not pay for an agent to acquire more information as it provides no gain in the mechanism and the cost of additional information is not reimbursed. It does not pay to acquire less information because then the agent would be likely to make a wrong choice of semi-robust lottery.
Proposition 3 Consider an information structure (Ω, S
Z , q, p) and an informationacquisition decision a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). Suppose that for each agent i there exist semi-robust lotteries given a. Then for any mechanism design problem on this information structure and any social choice function f , the social choice rule (a, f ) can be implemented.
Proof: Let t i be semi-robust lotteries for agent i given a. We show that if, for some large λ > 0, monetary transfers t i = λt i are used then it is Bayesian incentive compatible for agent i to acquire information a i and truthfully report his signal when f is implemented.
Participation Constraints: We can assume without loss of generality that t i is non-positive and that agent i's expected surplus under truthful participation is non-negative. Hence agent i would accept the mechanism (a, f, t).
Deviation to acquire more information: Suppose that a i is a strict subset of Z i = {−0, . . . , K i } and agent i chooses information acquisition Z i and observes s . But because the number of signals is finite we can choose λ large enough so that this effect is outweighed by the expected loss in transfers. The same reasoning applies to any deviation to a superset of a i . Hence, agent i does not gain anything by acquiring more information. In fact agent i is worse off as he is not reimbursed for the cost of acquiring additional information.
Deviation to acquire less or different information Suppose that agent i chooses actionâ i ∈ A i such that a i \â i = ∅. Then agent i cannot announces ai i with probability 1 because of the full-support assumption. Consequently, the expected transfer from agent i would be strictly higher than the expected transfer under the equilibrium action a i . To see this, observe that for any s 
Hence, agent i loses money from the semi-robust lottery in expectation by choosingâ i rather than a i . Once again, we can choose λ large enough so that this expected loss outweighs any gains in the mechanism or in the cost of information acquisition. Therefore this deviation is not profitable either.
Corollary 2 (Efficient Implementation.) Consider a mechanism design problem (Ω, S Z , q, p, X, u, c). If for each agent i there exist semi-robust lotteries given an efficient level of information acquisition a * , then (a * , f * a * ) can be implemented.
Remark 2 (i) Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 are complementary. Correlated information is necessary for the existence of a semi-robust lottery, hence Proposition 3 does not apply to the case with private value and independent information. However, Proposition 1 guarantees efficient implementation for that case. On the other hand, there is a situation to which Proposition 3 is applicable, but Proposition 1 is not. For example, take Example 2 and suppose thats i,1 , i = α, β is not available. So only additional information that is available is the signal that reveals V . Then the assumption for Proposition 1 is violated given efficient information acquisition. 19 However, it is easy to verify that there exists a semi-robust lottery given efficient information acquisition in this example because i's additional signal about V is not informative abouts j,0 .
(ii) It is easy to show that there does not exist a semi-robust lottery given efficient information acquisition in Example 1. The assumption for Proposition 1 is not satisfied in Example 1, either. 20 However efficient implementation is trivially possible in this example. So those sufficient conditions for efficient implementation in Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 are not necessary. (iii) We can directly check that there is no semi-robust lottery given efficient information acquisition in Example 2. For a semi-robust lottery, an agent must strictly prefers to announce ω α (resp. ω β ) when he believes that the true state is more likely to be ω α (resp. ω β ). In addition, he must strictly prefer to announce ω α even when s i,0 = ω α and s i,1 = ω β , i.e. he is sure that the state is ω β . This is clearly inconsistent. (iv) Consider a standard mechanism design problem without information acquisition. In this environment, Condition B of d'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet [11] is necessary and sufficient for budget-balanced implementation of every social choice function:
It is well known that the second condition is necessary and sufficient for implementation of every social choice function without budget balance. This second condition implies that t i is a semi-robust lottery for agent i in an environment without information acquisition and is equivalent to assuming that all conditional distributions are distinct, i.e. h i (·|s i ) = h i (·| s i ) for any s i , s i = s i (see Aoyagi [1] ). The inequality in condition B is similar to our condition (7), but not directly applicable to our setting with information acquisition. Introduce information acquisition and suppose that a = (a i , a −i ) is chosen, with a i ⊆ Z i . Then the corresponding condition is that h
21 Thus we need to strengthen this condition to (7) to guarantee efficient implementation with information acquisition. (v) In Bikhchandani [6] , payment schemes called partially-robust lotteries were used for efficient implementation. A semi-robust lottery is a partiallyrobust lottery but not vice versa. A more restrictive payment scheme is needed in this paper in part because, unlike in [6] , the information opportunities available to an agent cannot be ranked by informativeness.
In our setting with information acquisition, it may not be immediately clear whether there exist semi-robust lotteries for each agent. Below we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of semi-robust lotteries and, by Proposition 3, for efficient implementation.
Fix a ∈ A. Let S Suppose that, given a, we can order S ai i as s i (1), s i (2), ... in such a way that we can sequentially separate them one by one after eliminating the preceding elements, i.e.,
This suggests that information acquisition does not introduce any additional constraint when implementing the most informative action a i = Z i . This is in fact the case. If h i (·|s
for every i, then there exist semirobust lotteries given a = (Z 1 , . . . , Zn) for every i. Hence, any efficient allocation (in fact any allocation) given a i = Z i is implementable in this case.
and so on. Then, as shown next, there exist semi-robust lotteries for agent i given a.
Proposition 4 Suppose that, given action profile a ∈ A, S ai i can be ordered as s i (1), . . . , s i (R), where R = |S ai i |, so that s i (r) is separated from {s i (r + 1), . . . , s i (R)} for each r = 1, 2, . . . , R−1. Then there exist semi-robust lotteries for agent i given a.
The proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix. If there is no information acquisition, then our sequential separability condition is weaker than Crémer and McLean [9] 's necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction. In our terminology, Crémer and McLean's condition --that the belief of any type of an agent should not be a convex combination of other types of that agent --is equivalent to saying that every s ai i ∈ S ai i can be separated from S ai i simultaneously. On the other hand, we only require that agent i's signals can be separated sequentially in some order.
Full Surplus Extraction
Full surplus extraction occurs in a mechanism design problem if it is Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational for agents to acquire the ex ante efficient information level and truthfully report their signals while the mechanism designer implements the ex post efficient rule and collects transfers such that each agent's interim expected utility is always zero. We need to strengthen the definition of semi-robust lotteries of Section 4 to obtain full surplus extraction.
A function π i : S a → R is a robust lottery given (a i , a −i ) for agent i if If the left-hand side of (7) Next, we show that the existence of robust lotteries is sufficient for full surplus extraction.
Proposition 5 Consider an information structure (Ω, S Z , q, p) and an information acquisition decision a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ). Suppose that for each agent i there exist robust lotteries given a. Then for any mechanism design problem on this information structure and any social choice function f , the social choice rule (a, f ) can be implemented such that each agent's interim expected surplus is zero.
Proof: Let f be a social choice function for a mechanism design problem on this information structure. Let π i be a robust lottery for agent i given a. Define
where λ > 0 and
It is straightforward to check that the mechanism (a, f, t) satisfies (3) with the left-hand side equal to c i (a i ).
By choosing λ sufficiently large we can ensure that for all s ai i ∈ S ai i and s
where the second equality follows from (8) and the inequality from (9). Thus, if agent i chooses information level a i , he has no incentive to lie or opt out after any realization of his signal.
Suppose, instead, that agent i chooses information levelâ i ⊃ a i . The use of robust lotteries ensures that, conditional on selection ofâ i ⊃ a i , the optimal strategy is to truthfully announce s 
where the equality follows from (1) and (8) . Agent i would lose c i (â i )−c i (a i ) > 0 by deviating toâ i ⊃ a i , making this deviation unprofitable.
Finally, suppose that agent i chooses information levelâ i such that a i \â i = ∅. Then, an argument similar to that in the last paragraph of the proof of Proposition 3 implies that if agent i announces any s By choosing λ > 0 sufficiently large one can ensure that after choosingâ i , agent i is better off not participating, thus yielding a payoff of −c i (â i ), rather than participate and lie about observing some s ai i which yields a payoff smaller than −c i (â i ). Hence, it is not profitable to chooseâ i rather than a i .
Recall that a * is the ex ante efficient information acquisition level and f * a * is the ex post efficient rule associated with a mechanism design problem. The following is immediate.
Corollary 3 (Full surplus extraction.) Consider a mechanism design problem (Ω, S Z , q, p, X, u, c). If for each agent i there exist robust lotteries given an efficient level of information acquisition a * , then there exists a mechanism (a * , f * a * , t * ) that is incentive compatible, interim individually rational, and satisfies
We end this section with a characterization result for robust lotteries. The necessary and sufficient condition in Proposition A is stronger than the sufficient condition of Proposition 4.
Proposition A (Bikhchandani [6] ). Robust lotteries given (a i , a −i ) exist for agent i iff for each s 
Discussion
This paper examines when efficient implementation and full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible in a setting with covert information acquisition by agents. What makes this problem nontrivial is that we need to implement both efficient allocation and efficient information acquisition. We illustrate by an example that correlation of agents' private signals does not guarantee even efficient implementation.
It is interesting to compare sufficient conditions for efficient implementation and for full surplus extraction. First, as already noted, the sufficient conditions for (the existence of) semi-robust lotteries in Proposition 4 are weaker than the necessary and sufficient conditions for robust lotteries in Proposition A. Second, Proposition 2 shows that the sufficient condition for efficient implementation in Proposition 1 is generically satisfied if
Proposition 6 establishes that a generic sufficient condition for existence of robust lotteries is |S
If (11) is satisfied then so is (10) . It follows from (11) that min{|Ω −i |, |S Zi i |} is less than or equal to min{|Ω −i |, |S 0 −i |}, which is less than or equal to |S 0 −i |. Not surprisingly, the sufficient conditions for efficient implementation are weaker than those for full surplus extraction.
We have not pursued the tightness of these conditions. Identifying necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient implementation and full surplus extraction are left for future research.
We can obtain similar results under much weaker assumptions on the information structure if we relax exact efficiency/FSE to approximate efficiency/FSE and allow the mechanism to implement random action profiles. Each agent's incentive constraints and interim individually rational constraints are more easily satisfied when the other agents' signals are more informative, i.e., the other agents acquire more information. For exact efficiency, the level of information acquisition must be at the efficient level. For approximate efficiency, however, we can dispense with this upper bound of information by letting agents acquire the maximum amount of information with small probability. In this way, we can exploit the maximum amount of information with very little reduction in efficiency. 22 We noted in Remark 1(v) that Proposition 1 extends to sequential information within agents. One can also have sequential information acquisition across agents, where agents observe their signals sequentially and report them to the mechanism designer who makes information-acquisition decisions across agents using realizations of all the signals that have been previously observed by the agents. 23 It would be interesting to examine sequential information acquisition across agents in this model. 22 A similar exercise is done in Obara [23] and Rahman and Obara [25] . Some results in Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [14] and Kandori [19] are based on a similar idea. 23 Gershkov and Szentes [15] characterize the optimal voting mechanism with sequential information acquisition without monetary transfer when agents have identical preferences. To prove Proposition 4, we first prove a lemma. In the following, we fix an action profile a ∈ A and denote h 
The LP has a feasible solution iff every feasible solution to the dual satisfies λ( s by (13) . This proves the proposition.
